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Abstract In experimental settings, scientists often “make” new things, in which case
the aim is to intervene in order to produce experimental objects and processes—
characterized as ‘effects’. In this discussion, I illuminate an important performative
function in measurement and experimentation in general: intervention-based experi-
mental production (IEP). I argue that even though the goal of IEP is the production
of new effects, it can be informative for causal details in scientific representations.
Specifically, IEP can be informative about causal relations in: regularities under study;
‘intervention systems’, which are measurement/experimental systems; and new tech-
nological systems.
Keywords Experimentation · Intervention · Production · Stabilization · Effects · van
Fraassen · Hacking · Representation · Technology · Technological systems
1 Introduction
Philosophers have thoroughly explored the role of representation in measurement by
addressing the mathematical representability of the physical world.1 Early accounts
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of measurement focus on the systematic assignment of quantitative values (e.g. num-
bers or vectors) to objects in the world (Helmholtz 1887; Campbell 1920; Nagel
1930). Philosophers of science refer to this tradition as the ‘Representation Theory
of Measurement’ (RTM).2 The general focus of RTM has been to analyze the condi-
tions for representation in measurement by looking at the relation between numbers,
instruments, scales, and magnitudes. More recently, the role of representation in mea-
surement has been re-envisioned by Hacking (1983) and van Fraassen (2008) in order
to account for the complexity of measurement practice. Both philosophers discuss
intervention in addition to representation. Each philosopher broadens intervention
to experimentation. For example, van Fraassen acknowledges the complex relations
between experiment and measurement:
In general there is no such simple relation between observation, experiment, and
measurement. This is in part because of the complexity of the instrumentation
involved. But it is also because measurements occur only as special elements of
the experimental procedure by which objects are deliberately placed in unusual,
artificially designed conditions—conditions in which they are made to respond
to the questions put to them. That intricate construction of well-designed instru-
mental set-up for experimentation is what we must inspect first, to understand
the intricacies of measurement in general. (2008, pp. 93–94)
The role of “artificially designed conditions” is important for a specific type of inter-
vention discussed by both Hacking and van Fraassen: experimental production. Each
philosopher considers how measurement/experimental practice can “produce” new
things rather than simply represent natural phenomena. Hacking discusses the role
of experimental arrangements in producing experimental “effects” (1983, pp. 224–
226). van Fraassen (2008) discusses representational, mimetic, and productive roles
for instruments, each of which is significant for scientific representation (2008, pp.
93–95).
I draw a simple distinction between two types of experimental practices, which I
will make technical later: When scientists measure/experiment they can take measure-
ments, in which case the primary aim is to represent natural phenomena. Scientists
can also make measurements, in which case the aim is to intervene in order to produce
experimental objects and processes—characterized as ‘effects’. In this discussion, I
focus on the latter to illuminate an important performative function in measurement
and experimentation in general: intervention in the form of production. I refer to this
function as intervention-based experimental production (IEP, hereafter). The question
that I pose: Is IEP informative for representation?
The philosophical issue that I hope to address is that it is not straightforward that
effects are useful for representational practice. I argue that even though the goal of IEP
is the production of new effects, IEP can be informative for scientific representation.
Specifically, I present two IEP conditions to show how manipulating experimental con-
ditions has the consequence of indicating causal relations. I apply IEP to be informative
2 See Stevens (1946), Suppes and Zinnes (1963), Ellis (1966), Pfanzagl (1968), Krantz (1964), Roberts
(1979), Berka (1983), Kyburg (1984) and Narens et al. (1985)—among others.
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about causal relations in: (1) regularities under study; (2) ‘intervention systems’, which
are measurement/experimental systems; and (3) new technological systems.
I organize my discussion into two parallel scientific processes: physical interaction
and representational information.3 This way of organizing the discussion will help
to understand how experimental production works, and how IEP interaction is infor-
mative for representation. In Sect. 2, I detail the physical interaction in IEP by using
Hacking (1983) and van Fraassen (2008). In Sect. 3, I describe how IEP is representa-
tionally informative by describing three relations between experiment and theoretical
representation. I then apply the IEP conditions to the case study of arsenic-consuming
bacteria. In Sect. 4, I apply IEP generally to regularities, intervention systems, and
technological innovations.
2 Intervention-based experimental production: interaction
In this section, I detail how IEP physical interaction works. Two important com-
ponents of intervention require explication: First, what are the products of mea-
surement/experimental intervention? Second, how do instruments and experimental
arrangements produce them? I draw on Hacking’s (1983) and van Fraassen’s (2008)
discussions to detail answers to both questions. But before this can be done, specific
points need to be made about ‘instruments’ and ‘experimental conditions’.
2.1 Preliminaries: ‘intervention systems’
In the subsequent sections, I outline the productive roles of instruments and experi-
mental conditions. While these roles are explicit in Hacking (1983) and van Fraassen
(2008), both philosophers are not explicit about concepts like ‘instruments’, ‘exper-
imental conditions’, and ‘arrangements’. As will become apparent in Sects. 3 and 4,
being explicit about scientific tools for intervention (e.g., instruments and experimental
conditions) is informative for representing causal relations.
I offer an organizational concept for understanding tools for intervention: ‘interven-
tion systems’, modeled loosely on the International Vocabulary of Metrology—Basic
and General Concepts and Associated Terms (VIM), which offers technical classi-
fication for measurement (JCGM 2008). My purpose in using VIM is to reference
important features of measurement, but also to apply them to components that occur
in larger experimental settings—hence the focus on ‘intervention’ rather than the dif-
ferentiation between measurement and experiment.
In VIM ‘measuring system’ indicates a single instrument or assembly of instruments
that provide information about a system under investigation. VIM defines measuring
system as: “Set of one or more measuring instruments and often other devices, includ-
ing any reagent and supply, assembled and adapted to give information used to generate
measured quantity values within specified intervals for quantities of specified kinds”
(JCGM 2008, 3.2). On my view ‘intervention system’ includes some features of mea-
3 This is parallel to van Fraassen’s stated features of measurement: “A measurement is at the same time a
physical interaction and a meaningful information-gathering process” (2008, p. 91).
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surement systems, but I place emphasis on ‘experimental conditions’. ‘Intervention
system’ encompasses: experimental conditions, procedures, and results.
‘Experimental condition’ refers to any varying or constant physical components
within a given experimental setting. There are four important notes here:
First, these conditions can be partitioned into preparatory conditions, instrument
conditions, and other causally relevant conditions. These distinctions are made depend-
ing on the experimental purposes. Additionally, the distinctions may blur in some
experimental settings and be useful in others. For example ‘preparatory conditions’ can
refer to manipulations that occur prior to the main experimental setting. In microscopy,
for instance, samples are dissected and treated with fixative to meet the standards of
the given microscopic measurement practice, prior to taking a microscopic reading.4
Depending on the kind of science, there can be different stages of measurement prepa-
ration. The difference between instrument and experimental conditions can blur as
well. In physical measurement, there are sometimes simple distinctions between the
instrument and the thing being measured. But in certain experimental contexts, it is
difficult to distinguish what counts as an instrument. For example, in biological exper-
iments an organism’s physiology (model system) can be manipulated in order to track
developmental functions. In this case, the organism is manipulated—as a set of condi-
tions or as an instrument, but the organism is also the target of measurement. In some
intervention systems the only conditions worth noting are instrument conditions. In
other systems, there is a complex set of causally sensitive conditions. My discussion
of ‘arrangements’ in Sect. 2.2 will be relevant to this point. For Hacking, experimental
arrangements are embodied by instruments. I take the broader view that they do not
have to be.
Second, I do not make a metaphysical specification of ‘physical component’. Rather,
I suggest that identifying what counts as a physical component is an epistemological
activity related to forming representations. Important for my account in Sect. 3 is that it
is scientifically useful to represent experimental conditions in terms of relevant param-
eters and relations. What counts as ‘relevant’ is a larger issue for another discussion.
To bypass this issue here, I simply offer that what counts as ‘relevant’ component can
depend on the purposes of the experiment. Third, much like the evaluation of what
counts as a ‘relevant component’, what counts as an ‘experimental setting’ will also
be based on pragmatic experimental considerations. Biological and ecological exper-
iment is particularly important because lab experiments mimic field experiments and
field experiments contain considerable manipulations that one would see in a lab set-
ting (Scheiner and Gurevitch 2000). Similar issues of control in experimental and
natural settings apply in the social sciences (Morgan 2013).
‘Procedure’ refers to a detailed description of relations between experimental
conditions. VIM summarizes measurement procedures: “Detailed description of a
measurement according to one or more measurement principles and to a given mea-
surement method, based on a measurement model and including any calculation to
obtain a measurement result” (JCGM 2008, 2.6). Essential for the VIM character-
4 The concept of ‘preparatory condition’ will be important for Sect. 4.
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ization are measurement principles5 and methods.6 But such a detailed account of
procedure is not necessary for our characterization of ‘intervention system’ because
in some experimental settings there is no detailed measurement principle and in other
settings there is no detailed measurement method. As we will see in Sect. 3.1, other
representational considerations can be useful for such cases.
Finally, ‘result’ can be applied broader than the VIM characterization. VIM 2.9
defines ‘result’: “Set of quantity values being attributed to a measurand [i.e. quantity
intended to be measured] together with any other available relevant information”
(JCGM 2008, 2.9). My characterization of result includes information generated at
many steps in IEP, including: planning, preparation, and modification. Sometimes
these results can be iterative.7
In the next section, reference to ‘instrument’ and ‘arrangement’ can be clarified
by citing ‘experimental conditions’ of the ‘intervention system’. The organizational
concept provided by ‘intervention system’ will also be important for Sects. 3 and 4 in
order to dissect empirical examples.
2.2 Productive views
Before summarizing IEP in Sects. 2.3 and 2.4, it is important to note that there are
other foundational philosophical concepts in the literature that focus on experimental
production. I discuss these in order to set up two points: (1) There are complex relations
between what is produced and how those productions are useful for representation;
(2) The relationship between experimental productions and their representations (e.g.,
in models) is idealized in philosophical accounts.
I begin with the concept of ‘nomological machine’, which is important for under-
standing the interplay between production and representation. Cartwright summarizes
the concept: “What is a nomological machine? It is a fixed (enough) arrangement of
components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable
(enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular
behavior that we represent in our scientific laws” (1999, p. 50). Cartwright’s character-
ization has elements that are foundational for intervention and representation. That is,
nomological machines produce stable physical arrangements with repeatable capaci-
ties. In addition to this, scientists use idealized models to characterize the stable behav-
ior of the nomological machines. Repeated behavior of nomological machines can give
rise to laws: “Laws of nature obtain—to the extent that they do obtain—on account of
the capacities; or more explicitly, on account of the repeated operation of a system of
components with stable capacities in particularly fortunate circumstances” (Cartwright
1998). While this discussion will not focus on many concepts such as ‘laws’ and
5 VIM 2.4: “Phenomenon serving as a basis of a measurement” (JCGM 2008, 2.4). Here, ‘phenomenon’
broadly refers to physical, chemical, or biological processes and effects (e.g., energy absorption, thermo-
electric effect, and metabolism).
6 VIM 2.5: “Generic description of a logical organization of operations used in a measurement” (JCGM
2008, 2.5).
7 For a thorough discussion of iteration in the history of measuring temperature see Chang (2004). I will
reference part of this discussion in Sects. 3 and 4.
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‘capacities’, much of the discussion in this section and Sect. 3 pertains to Cartwright’s
interaction between the regularities that are produced under context-specific condi-
tions and how scientists characterize those regularities. My discussion is in-line with
Cartwright when it comes to the stable behavior of productions as being useful for
representations, but I will not make any claims about representations as law-like.
I transition to Rheinberger’s (1992, 1997, 2008) concept of the ‘experimental sys-
tem’ because it runs parallel to ‘nomological machine’ in terms of the many relations
between production and representation; and because I will refer to it again when dis-
cussing technological systems in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3. However, it is important to note
that it is difficult to establish an isomorphic relationship between Cartwright’s and
Rheinberger’s concepts because experimental systems do not have autonomous lay-
ers that can be separated, while nomological machines seem to have elements that
can be separated (e.g. arrangement of conditions and capacities). Additionally, Rhein-
berger focuses on the extra consideration of indexicality in the form of social and
institutional considerations. Finally, Rheinberger takes the focus off of theory/model
development as the main activity in science. In philosophy of science there is often a
focus on scientific research with the vantage on theory development. But for Rhein-
berger (1992, 1997, 2008), experimental systems drive research. In Sects. 3 and 4,
I specify how experimentation drives representations and also technological devel-
opment. I take experimentation, representation, and technology to be co-developing
processes, mediated by the user/experimenter.
Rheinberger defines ‘experimental system’ as: “A basic unit of experimental activity
combining local, technical, instrumental, institutional, social, and epistemic aspects”
(Rheinberger 1997, p. 238)—where these components are difficult to differentiate into
“autonomous” layers of the scientific process (Rheinberger 1992, p. 3). Experimental
systems consist of physical arrangements but also provide knowledge “that we do
not yet have” to questions that are still unclear (Rheinberger 1992, p. 4). There are
at least two important things to note that are of relevance for this discussion. First,
for Rheinberger experimental systems involve the role of the researcher in using the
experimental system to ask further questions:
The more familiar a scientist is with his experimental set-up, the more effec-
tively its inherent possibilities open up. Formulated paradoxically, the more an
experimental system is tied to the skill and experience of the researcher, the more
independently it develops. (Rheinberger 1992, p. 1)
The part of this quote that is important for my discussion is the emphasis on exper-
imental skill for the development of experimental systems. This is relevant for the
discussion in Sect. 3 where I outline the user-relation in representation. Not only are
scientists involved with the skill of effective production, but also there is interplay
between how scientists produce and how they use those productions for the purpose of
representation. Of further relevance to the user-relation, in Sect. 4.2 I discuss differenti-
ating intervention systems and technological systems; and in Sect. 4.3, I briefly discuss
Ihde’s (1990, 1991, 1993) concept of ‘embodiment relations’, which is important for
the relation between technological productions and representation. Embodiment rela-
tions require objects (artifacts) through which the environment is perceived—such as
the use of lenses for distance.
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The second important point to note about Rheinberger’s (1992, 1997) characteriza-
tion of ‘experimental system’ is the discussion of technological systems. According
to Rheinberger, experimental systems can be characterized as “activities”; but once
they stabilize, they become ‘technological systems’, “…which embody the current,
stabilized knowledge in a more efficient form” (Rheinberger 1992, p. 6). The use of
‘technological systems’ nicely complements the use of ‘effect’ in the next section.
Both are stabilized systems. Additional concepts relevant to ‘technological system’—
like Rheinberger’s ‘technical object’ and also the notion of ‘stabilization’—will come
into play in Sect. 4, where I discuss the relation between scientific production and
technology.
Finally, it is worth noting that the simple line between productions and representa-
tions is highly idealized. van Fraassen (2008) (as well as Bachelard 1984) argues that
there is a coevolution between scientific practice and theoretical representation. But
even more complex are recent philosophical developments such as Carusi (2016a, b)
who discusses the complex epistemological, social, and computational/technological
components that are involved in models. For Carusi (2016a) a Model-Simulation-
Experiment-System (MSE-system) is mediated by technology, symbolic systems, and
social relations. Carusi (2016b) nicely characterizes the level of complexity in the in
a given physiological model:
Each of the elements in the model system is a temporary moment in the process,
materialised through apparatus (wetlab apparatus and instruments, the computers
and computational infrastructure for the running of simulations), symbolic sys-
tems (language, mathematical and numerical symbols, graphs and diagrams),
and different modes of observation, such as the output of tracking devices,
microscopy, and the visualisations generated by simulations. (2016b, p. 55)
While model construction is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is important to note
the entanglements between instruments, representations/symbolic systems, and output
productions will often be idealized in philosophical accounts. I think that the purpose
of such idealization is to emphasize certain relationships. This is the attitude that I take
in the remaining discussion. By leaving out e.g., social relations and language, I do
not intend a positive claim that these variables are unimportant. Rather, my focus is on
the specific relation between production and causal representation. Further relations
remain open.
2.3 The production of “effects” from experimental arrangements
Hacking’s particular account of intervention requires distinguishing ‘phenomena’ and
‘effects’. He characterizes ‘phenomena’ as “observable regularities” (1983, p. 221).
These are regularities that are not the result of experimental intervention—e.g., the
planets and stars. According to Hacking, there are few phenomena in nature waiting to
be observed but science is full of regularities that are produced through intervention,
as ‘effects’ (1983, p. 227).8 He distinguishes the two types of regularities:
8 Often, Hacking uses ‘phenomena’ for ‘effects’.
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Phenomena and effects are in the same line of business: noteworthy discernible
regularities. The words ‘phenomena’ and ‘effect’ can often serve as synonyms,
yet they point in different directions. Phenomena remind us, in that semicon-
scious repository of language, of events that can be recorded by the gifted
observer who does not intervene in the world by who watches the stars. Effects
remind us of the great experiments after whom, in general, we name the effects:
the men and women, the Compton and Curie, who intervened in the course of
nature, to create a regularity which, at least at first, can be seen as regular (or
anomalous) only against the further background of theory. (Hacking 1983, pp.
224–225)
This addresses the products of measurement/experimental intervention. But how do
instruments and experimental arrangements produce them? Effects require carefully
planned production conditions. According to Hacking, the aim of experiments is to
“create,” “refine,” and repeat the effects produced in an experiment (1983, pp. 229–
230). But because effects fall apart when conditions are modified, it is likely that
effects are only produced under specific conditions in an experimental setting (1983,
pp. 225–226).
Hacking illustrates the condition sensitivity of effects by describing the original
Hall effect experiment, where an electric current is passed through a gold leaf in
the presence of a perpendicular magnetic field. These conditions produce a potential
difference across the conductor (the leaf) and at right angles to the magnetic field
and conductor (1983, p. 224). Hacking says that even though the conditions were
carefully planned and the apparatus was human-made, we have the intuition that the
phenomenon was “discovered” in the laboratory rather than created (1983, p. 225).
But according to Hacking, the “arrangement” of conditions behind the Hall effect
only occurs in the laboratory. He says, “I suggest, in contrast, that the Hall effect
does not exist outside of certain kinds of apparatus. Its modern equivalent has become
technology, reliable and routinely produced. The effect, at least in a pure state, can only
be embodied by such devices” (1983, p. 225). But Hacking acknowledges that if such
experimental conditions were to occur in nature, the Hall Effect could be produced:
“If anywhere in nature there is such an arrangement, with no intervening causes, then
the Hall effect occurs” (1983, p. 226). The important point here is that experimental
conditions require careful organization (arrangement) to produce effects. In the next
section I further explore the productive role of experiments by comparing it with
non-productive experiments.
2.4 Instruments as engines of creation
van Fraassen (2008) discusses at least three roles of instrumentation in experimenta-
tion. First, instrumentation has a representative role. He cites Heidelberger’s (2003)
classification of the representative role of instruments: “This role the instruments have
in relation to a theoretical context: “the goal is to represent symbolically in an instru-
ment the relations between natural phenomena” [Heidelberger 2003]” (van Fraassen
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2008, p. 94).9 For example, according to van Fraassen, the Scanning Tunneling Elec-
tron Microscope requires theoretical context in order to make measurements (2008, p.
94). I fill in some explicit reasoning for the implicit point. To make theoretical conclu-
sions about the object of microscopic study, the understanding of physical processes
that govern the microscope is important. For example, electron microscopes and light
microscopes use different processes to create the image. The electron microscope uses
a high voltage electron beam to form the image (e.g., Transmission Electron Micro-
scope), or it uses detection of low energy ‘secondary electrons’ emitted by the surface
of the object as a result of excitation by the ‘primary electron beam’ (e.g., Scan-
ning Electron Microscope). It is important to note Heidelberger’s (2003) discussion
of Duhem’s (1906) point that for the theoretician the understanding of these physical
processes is necessary to make conclusions about the objects of study. In contrast,
the observer (e.g., the lab assistant) can make key observations without being able to
symbolically represent the details of the experiment (Duhem 1906, p. 147).
Second, for van Fraassen instruments have an “mimetic” or, to use Heidelberger’s
(2003) terminology, “imitative role”. This is “…when instrumentation produces phe-
nomena, in controlled artifacts, meant to mimic effects “as they appear in nature
without human intervention”” (van Fraassen 2008, p. 94). According to van Fraassen,
“When a phenomenon created artificially is taken to imitate a naturally occurring
phenomenon, a substantial theoretical claim is involved” (2008, p. 95). That is, the
relationship between the “artifact” and natural phenomena must be established in the
relevant respects for there to be any lessons from the controlled artificial experiment
about the natural phenomena. Van Fraassen uses the term ‘phenomena’ in a very
specific way. Similar to Hacking (1983), for van Fraassen, phenomena are observable
objects, events, and processes that are independent of our interaction with them (2008,
p. 283). Van Fraassen’s specification is that phenomena include all observable entities,
even if they are not being observed (2008, p. 307). Both van Fraassen and Hacking
use ‘phenomena’ when referring to experimental productions as well as natural phe-
nomena. The reason will become apparent in van Fraassen’s specification of the final
role of instruments.
According to van Fraassen, instruments produce “phenomena” that humans do not
normally experience. This is instrumentation in the “productive” (Heidelberger 2003)
or “manufacturing” sense (Boon 2004). Van Fraassen uses the example of Von Guer-
icke’s electrical generation on a sulfur ball. According to him, even though nature
contains electroluminescence, the “relationship between luminescence, rotation, fric-
tion, and sulphur was a new phenomenon” (van Fraassen 2008, p. 95). I interpret this
to mean that what makes sulfur luminescence a new production is the arrangement
of experimentally controlled conditions. These conditions can be found in nature, but
their organization (or arrangement) is experimentally controlled. This interpretation
is consistent with van Fraassen’s specification that in such experimental settings, lan-
guage of “production” is more appropriate than language of “discovery”, even though
we can interpret a sense of discovery. He says, “In such examples it is not unnatural,
even if sometimes confusing, to speak of discovery. A new phenomenon is produced,
9 This is a technical way to explain the simple characterization of ‘taking’ measurements, mentioned in
Sect. 1.
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but the important news is that it occurs, and putatively always occurs, under certain
general conditions, which may also be realized in nature—if that this is so, then that is a
discovery” (95). Van Fraassen continues that language of “production” is more appro-
priate because it highlights the role of instruments as “engines of creation” (2008, p.
96). He specifies the function of such engines is to create new observable phenomena
(objects, events, and processes) that are instructive about nature: “They create new
observable phenomena, ones that may never have happened in nature, playing Hei-
delberger’s productive role, only sometimes to imitate nature but always to teach us
more about nature” (2008, p. 96).
Van Fraassen’s characterization of produced phenomena is parallel to Hacking’s
“effects” for three reasons. First, both are context sensitive because they are realized
only under specific conditions/arrangements. Second, both can be realized in nature
if those conditions occur, but mostly appear in an experimental setting.10 Third, both
are instructive about regularities in nature.
I think that the term ‘effect’ offers a simple way to summarize the products of IEP,
without creating conceptual confusion. I synthesize the discussion above into two
general conditions for IEP, (IEP-1) and (IEP-2):
(IEP-1)Physical condition sensitivity/insensitivity: Intervention systems consist of
organized experimental conditions and as such the effects that emerge are often sen-
sitive to changes in conditions.
A general mechanism for why many experimental effects are context sensitive is an
interesting topic for another discussion. One suggestion is that the sheer number and
combination of physical conditions raises the probability that there is full system dis-
turbance. Specifying this would give insight into the issue of how often effects occur
in nature. It is also important to add the qualification that both van Fraassen and Hack-
ing discuss invariant results: results that are relatively stable (or similar) with varying
experimental conditions.11 For example, it can be the case that modification of prepara-
tory conditions produces the same effect. Such invariant effects may be uncommon,
but as will be mentioned in Sect. 4, they are important for building representations
about what is intrinsic to a target system versus what is produced by instruments.
(IEP-2)IEP instructiveness: By studying how intervention systems produce effects,
we can learn about causal relations within the regularities under study as well as the
intervention system.
10 It is important to note that there are differences between the two philosophical accounts—namely, when it
comes to unobservables. van Fraassen (2008) disagrees that experimental practices like microscopy provide
a “window” into an unobservable world. Rather, he thinks that such practices produce new observables.
He says, “All those instruments which purport to represent the invisible mimetically, can be thought of,
not as windows into the nether world, but as productive experimental arrangements” (2008, p. 100). In
my discussion I am not committed to the status of unobservables nor to the view that microscopy is better
explained through production rather than the observation of observables. My concern is to understand the
usefulness of IEP in general for representational practice. But the scope of what counts as an IEP is open.
11 Relevant here is the literature on robustness and experiment: See Horwich (1982), Hacking (1983),
Franklin (1986, 1997), Sober (1989), Cartwright (1991), Trout (1998), Culp (1994), Staley (2004), Wood-
ward (2006), Stegenga (2009) and Keyser (2016a, b).
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IEP can be instructive about our experimental conditions (e.g., instruments), the reg-
ularities that occur in nature, and new technological regularities. But how this works
requires careful attention to how effects inform representations, which I turn to next.
This will be explored later in a new condition: IEP-4.
3 IEP and representation
In Sect. 2, I specified the products of IEP (effects) and how the production works in
terms of instruments and arrangements, or more generally: experimental conditions
in intervention systems. However, it is not straightforward that effects are useful for
representational practice. In this section I explore the representational importance of
IEP. I specify representation in general and the role of representation that is useful
for this discussion: representation of causal relations. Finally, I apply the two IEP
conditions (IEP-3 and IEP-4) to the case study of arsenic-consuming bacteria to show
how production is useful for causal information.
3.1 Preliminaries: selective representation
Before addressing how effects can be instructive for representations, it is important
to provide a general characterization of ‘representation’. Scientific representations
involve selective content (Giere 2006; van Fraassen 2008). I take there two be types
of selective representational content. The first is selecting specific aspects or parts of a
target system (e.g., natural phenomenon or effect). The second is selecting degrees of
emphasis for those parts. When representing the scientist can select certain aspects of
the target system. This is applicable to scientific representations that selectively focus
on specific properties, while excluding others. For example: When taking a blood
sample of an organism, only a subset of total physiological properties is represented
(e.g., thyroid hormones); Brain scans offer selective functional and structural imagery
of the brain (Giere 2006); and artificial cells are created but only a subset of processes
(e.g., enzymatic function) is represented. It is important to note that in this exclusion
process certain properties can be accurately represented. In other words, there can be
accuracy with respect to a specific property of a given natural phenomenon or effect.
The second aspect of selective representation involves degrees of emphasis for a
target. Specifically, an aspect of some target of representation can be idealized. For
example, according to Strevens (2008), Boyle’s gas law idealizes the causal structure
of real gases in three ways: (1) It ignores the long range attractive force between
molecules; (2) It represents molecules as non-colliding and infinitely small; (3) It
invokes classical physics rather than quantum mechanics. One of the benefits of ide-
alization is to simplify complex causal interactions. The pragmatic considerations of
what to simplify and for what purpose point to the final important feature of represen-
tation: The user relation in representation.
A representation does not represent on its own. What is represented and how it is
represented depends largely on the goals and purposes of the scientists (van Fraassen
2008, p. 23). For example, a scientist can use a model organism (e.g., a mouse) to
represent certain physiological processes of a target system (e.g., human response to
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carcinogens). The scientist selects which physiological features of the mouse repre-
sent certain processes in the human physiology and also to what degree. Because the
scientist selects the respects in which a representation represents a target, a two-place
relation between the representation and the target (Y is represented as F) can be sub-
stituted by a four-place relation between user, representation, target, and experimental
purposes: X represents Y as F, for purposes P [among other relations discussed by
Giere (2006) and van Fraassen (2008)].
It is also important to note that selective representation can occur at many levels in
measurement/experiment as well as in theoretical representation. For example, some-
times representations appear as processed images, mediated by algorithms (e.g., in
brain scans). Other times they appear as more processed models of the data. When
van Fraassen discusses that the physical sciences give us representations of nature, he
distinguishes between a theoretically postulated reality and the appearances (contents
of measurement outcomes) (2008, p. 289). He states that the contents of measurement
outcomes tell us how things look, but not how they are (van Fraassen 2008, p. 284).
For this reason they provide representationally limited perspectives on phenomena
(2008, p. 289). But theoretical models also provide representationally limited content.
According to van Fraassen, “The physical sciences give us representations of nature,
and scientific representation is in general three-faceted” (2008, p. 289). He describes
that the following three facets belong to theoretical models. According to his account,
theoretical models can: (1) depict/describe the ‘underlying reality’ behind the phe-
nomena12; (2) represent the observable phenomena; (3) explain and make predictions
about measurement outcomes (2008, p. 289). Van Fraassen describes how and under
what conditions theories represent phenomena:
Theories represent the phenomena just in case their models, in some sense, “share
the same structure” with those phenomena—that, in slogan form, is what is called
the semantic view of theories. My own variant upon this theme is that the phe-
nomena are, from a theoretical point of view, small, arbitrary, and chaotic—even
nasty, brutish, and short, one might say—but can be understood as embeddable
in beautifully simple but much larger mathematical models. Embedding, that
means displaying an isomorphism to selected parts of those models. (2008, p.
247; my emphasis)
There are two important aspects to note from this passage. First, theory provides
content “from a theoretical point of view.” Second, from this view, the non-elegant
phenomena are embedded into elegant mathematical structures, where embedding
means isomorphism to selected parts of the mathematical structures. From these two
points it is reasonable to conclude that van Fraassen is talking about a form of lim-
ited theoretical representation. I turn to the issue of theoretical representation next to
describe the relationship between experiment and theoretical representation.
12 Van Fraassen is not explicit about what descriptions of an underlying reality consist of, aside from saying
that such descriptions include e.g., micro structures, forces, fields, and global space-time structures (2008,
p. 263).
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3.2 Experiment and theoretical representation
In this section I present that that there are at least three important relations between
experiment and theoretical representation: (1) experiments fill in representational con-
tent for theory; (2) Theory represents information about the object of investigation; (3)
The systematic comparison of IEP conditions is informative for causal representations.
Van Fraassen makes the point that experimental productions are significant for the
development of theoretical representations.13 But the role of experiment isn’t merely
“hypothesis testing”. Van Fraassen specifies:
In contrast to the hypothesis testing role, there is another function of experi-
mentation, generally also described in the language of discovery, but actually an
essential ingredient in the joint evolution of experimental practice and theory.
We may describe it as theory writing by other means. (2008, pp. 111–112)
The key feature in van Fraassen’s characterization is that experiments are approached
within a developing theoretical framework that requires “consistent empirical ground-
ing for its theoretical parameters” (2008, p. 113). He cites Perrin’s multiple experiments
on Avagadro’s number as well as Millikan’s work on electron charge in the theoretical
contexts of developing atomic theory. Applicable to both is the statement:
For the experiment has shown by actual example that no other number will do;
that is the sense in which it has filled in the blank. So regarded, experimentation
is the continuation of theory construction by other means. Recalling the famous
Clausewitz view of war and diplomacy, I call this the “Clausewitz doctrine of
experimentation”. It makes the language of construction, rather than of discovery,
appropriate for experimentation as much as for theorizing. (van Fraassen 2008,
p. 112)
So, experiment fills in key representational information for theory by associating
theoretical parameters with specific empirical details (e.g., values). But this is not the
only interaction between theory and experimental practice.
Scientists also use theory to characterize what is investigated and the procedures
used to investigate it (2008, p. 124). While I agree with van Fraassen’s general account
of the joint evolution of theory and measurement/experimental practice, my focus
requires developing slightly different, though possibly consistent, details. The reason
for my divergence from his view is that in some scientific contexts theory is not fully
developed, but theoretical components can still be representationally informative.
I present two major assumptions about representation, useful for IEP. The first
assumption is that representing some thing (e.g., an effect) requires that we charac-
terize it in terms of parameters as well as relations. I am using ‘parameters’ to refer
to elements of a system that characterize the system. My use of ‘parameter’ will
sometimes overlap with the traditional use of ‘variable.’ As a result, I will refer to
both ‘parameters’ and ‘variables’ as ‘parameters.’ Traditionally, there is a difference
13 I depart from Hacking’s discussion because for him experimentation is not merely reducible to theory
building (1983, pp. 243–244). This creates differences in the views of the two philosophers that are outside
of the boundaries of this discussion.
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between the use of ‘parameters’ and ‘variables.’ ‘Parameters’ refer to constants (either
universal constants or invariants in the modeling set-up under consideration). ‘Vari-
able’ also defines certain characteristics of a system but with changing values within a
modeling set-up. However, variables in theoretical templates (e.g., Pressure (P) in PV
= nRT) can become parameters in certain intervention systems (e.g., a system where
pressure is kept constant to determine the temperature from change in volume).
Not only is it important to characterize a system with respect to a set of parameters,
but it is also important to specify relations between those parameters. A given relation
between parameters may or may not be a mathematical formulation. Usually it is a
mathematical formulation of an empirical regularity. For example, if we characterize
temperature in terms of only pressure and volume, this is uninformative. However, if
we say that temperature is characterized in terms of PV = nRT this provides an empir-
ical regularity that tells us how to measure temperature in virtue of its (theoretically
postulated) relation to volume and pressure. Characterizing some thing in terms of
parameters does not mean characterizing by just any parameters. Rather, characteri-
zation in terms of parameters in measurement means characterization by parameters
to which our IEP practices are applicable.
The second assumption about representation is that what decides the characteriza-
tion of those parameters is a theoretical representational framework. Assertions about
a phenomenon within the context of IEP look something like this: ‘a property X14 of
effect E was produced’. But it is important to add the proper qualification ‘a property
X of E was produced,in the context of some intervention system, I, and it was char-
acterized by some representational framework, R.’ In other words, how properties
are produced depends on intervention systems and how properties are characterized
depends on representational frameworks.
Broadly stated, what I mean by ‘theoretical representational framework’ is a body of
models15 that provide a way to interpret information about a phenomenon or effect.16
For example, the theoretical representational framework can, minimally, consist of
content about the relation between our instruments and some target (phenomenon or
effect). For instance, when gorillas use a stick to successfully measure the depth of
water before crossing a river they do not have to have a technical theory about length
measurement. To use the measuring devices successfully it is sufficient to have an
operational understanding of the relation between the measuring device (stick) and
the phenomenon (depth of river).
Theoretical representational frameworks can also be applied as well-developed
theories. That is, we characterize some target using parameters and relations between
parameters as described by the given theory. For example, suppose we are measuring
‘force’ as change of momentum of a system; and we are looking at an instance of a
ball colliding with the wall. First, we measure change in momentum. Then we relate
14 Depending on the type of measurement output (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio), we can specify this as
a quantity value or as a nominal property.
15 What I have in mind is a semantic view of theories, but this can also be applicable to a syntactic view of
theories.
16 The role of interpretation is open, here. It may depend on scientific purposes such as, prediction, expla-
nation, etc. It may also be different for theoreticians and modelers. See Weisberg (2006).
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the ‘change in momentum’ to ‘force’, mathematically, to get the measurement result
in terms of amount of force. Our measurement result (X amount of force) is subject to
a theoretical characterization provided by, e.g., Newtonian physics. That is, the force
of the system is the target being measured, and we characterize it as a Newtonian
mechanical system by the mathematical relations between Newtonian parameters—
such as, mass, distance vector, angle of impact, and time.
We can also apply theoretical frameworks to cases where there are no well-
developed theories to characterize a target. Suppose that with the use of the electron
microscope we have an output that contains something that looks like a “clump.”
Further, suppose that we have eliminated the characterization of this target as a result
produced in error—e.g., from a contaminated or poorly prepared specimen. We do not
have a well-developed theory that we can use to characterize the target. But we can
characterize it according to the parameters delineated by the theory of the instrument—
in this case, the electron microscope. So the target would be characterized as an area
that is high in electron density, referred to in scientific practice as a ‘dense body’.
To summarize, theoretical representation frameworks (minimal, well-developed,
and instrument) provide information about the object of investigation (whether natural
phenomenon or effect) by detailing parameters and relations between parameters.
But an important feature of IEP is that how we intervene is informative for how we
represent. I turn to the final relation between theory and experiment: the modification
of IEP conditions is informative for representing causal relations. I begin with a simple
example: the boiling point of water.
Chang details how the boiling point of water varies with differences in atmospheric
pressure and dissolved gas (Chang 2004, pp. 15–19). That is, different manipulations
of conditions will produce a different boiling point. The effect of boiling point is so
sensitive to the manipulation of conditions that water can boil at 101.9 ◦C merely in
the presence of dissolved gas (Chang 2004, p. 19). In the history of fixed points like
the boiling point of water, material conditions have to be fine-tuned to “manufac-
ture” fixity (2004, p. 49). The process of systematically fine-tuning such conditions,
like atmospheric pressure and dissolved gas, is informative for building theoretical
representations for how those conditions relate. For Chang, such experimental prac-
tices, through multiple iterations, produce understanding of the relations between
kinetic energy of molecules, pressure, and volume. The view I take is that when
experimental conditions (like atmospheric pressure) are modified it can inform how
to represent parameters and relations. The specific type of information useful from
IEP is information about causal relations. To elaborate this view, I use Woodward’s
(2010) modification of his (2003) account. The focus of the view is that manipulating
one variable to see changes in another is causally informative.
Woodward gives a basic characterization of ‘variable’: “A variable is simply a prop-
erty, quantity etc, which is capable of at least two different “values”” (2010, p. 291).
I take a slightly different view that conditions (e.g., experimental conditions) can be
treated as variables. As such, conditions are represented as variables (or parameters).
Additionally, I think that using ‘values’ suggests quantitative values. But variables can
be evaluated based on qualitative characteristics as well. So, on my view conditions
are represented as variables (or parameters) either quantitatively or qualitatively. This
distinction between conditions and variables (or parameters) is important because we
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ought to distinguish what is physically manipulated from representations of what is
manipulated.
Woodward provides the following characterization of what it is for some thing to
cause some thing else:
Consider the following characterization of what it is for X to cause Y (where
“cause” here means something like “X is causally relevant to Y at the type-
level”):
(M) X causes Y if and only if there are background circumstances B such that
if some (single) intervention that changes the value of X (and no other variable)
were to occur in B, then Y or the probability distribution of Y would change.
(2010, p. 292)
Woodward says, “Background circumstances are circumstances that are not explicitly
represented in the X − Y relationship, including both circumstances that are causally
relevant to Y and those that are not” (2010, p. 291). Woodward provides M as a basic
framework for evaluating causal relevance. But on his (2010) view, we can ask further
questions about the nature of the causal relationship (e.g., stability and specificity) by
expanding M. For example, to evaluate ‘stability’ we can ask whether the relationship
between X and Y continues to hold “in a range of other background circumstances Bk
different from the circumstances Bi ” (2010, p. 295).
I modify this characterization to be useful for IEP interaction and IEP representation.
The specification that I make about IEP interaction in IEP-3 is that it presents an
indication that two conditions are in a causal relation. This avoids any metaphysical
explication about the nature of causation. (Note that the conditions below are consistent
with (IEP-1) condition sensitivity/insensitivity and (IEP-2)IEP instructiveness,
discussed in Sect. 2.2.)
(IEP-3)IEP causal interaction: Take some experimental setting with total conditions
TC, which are preparatory, instrument, and experimental conditions. Partition TC
into relevant causal conditions C1 and C2, which are merely conditions we wish to
investigate. Partition the rest into background conditions B, which can be causally
relevant or irrelevant.
C1 and C2 are in a causal relation if and only if some (single) intervention that changes
C1 (and no other condition) were to occur in B, then C2 would change.
This characterization leaves open if the change in the relevant causal conditions is
a value change or qualitative change. The evaluation of change will most likely be
a theory-laden evaluation that depends on experimental context.17 Additionally, we
can modify IEP causal interaction to add more causal complexity—for example,
by modifying how we intervene or by adding more than one variable to evaluate
interaction effects.
(IEP-4)IEP representation of causes: Given that C1 and C2 are in a causal relation,
that relation can be selectively represented in terms of parameters (used to refer to spe-
17 See Heidelberger (2003) for a discussion of theory-ladenness and experimentation.
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cific conditions) and relations between parameters (used to refer to the type of causal
connection exhibited in the experiment), according to a theoretical representational
framework and pragmatic considerations.
Because representations are selective, the parameters and relations can directly repre-
sent C1 and C2 as well as representing the relation between C1 and C2 in relation to B.
Additionally, many types of causal relations can be represented. Here we can reference
Woodward’s causal ‘stability’. Some causes may be invariant with respect to back-
ground conditions and will be represented differently than causes that are sensitive to
background conditions.
We now have a characterization of how IEP can be informative for representations.
By manipulating conditions in IEP, we indicate causal relations. Those relations can
be represented using parameters and relations between parameters, according to a
theoretical representational framework. In the next section, I apply the details of IEP
to a specific case study: arsenic-consuming bacteria. Then in Sect. 4, I apply this
discussion broadly to representing causal relations about regularities under study,
intervention systems, and technological systems.
3.3 IEP and arsenic-consuming bacteria
Recently, disagreement has surfaced about the failure of reproducing results about an
arsenic-consuming living organism (Reaves et al. 2012). In 2010 a novel discovery
seemed to redefine how biologists understand the chemistry of living organisms by
questioning whether phosphorous is necessary for cellular function. I will expand the
story—starting from the realm of natural phenomena, moving through experimental
intervention (Wolfe-Simon et al. 2011; Reaves et al. 2012), and ending with IEP
(Basturea et al. 2012). By discussing a specific mimetic intervention system used by
Basturea et al. (2012), I will show how intervention systems can be used to specify
causal relations that are relevant for building representations.
I begin by stating important background details and initial conclusions. These details
will set the stage for a puzzle about how to represent the causal details of these
microorganisms. A bacterium from the arsenic-rich waters of Mono Lake—GFAJ-1
of the Halomonadaceae family—was transported via an artificial medium to laboratory
conditions and evaluated on its ability to process arsenate. Notice how even in the initial
step of transportation, lab elements are slowly added to preserve the bacterium. As
the story unfolds, manipulation and production take over. According to Wolfe-Simon
et al. (2011), living organisms use six major nutrient elements: carbon, hydrogen,
nitrogen, oxygen, sulfur, and phosphorus (1163). But arsenic is neither used as a
nutrient nor is incorporated into any known organism’s DNA. There is a chemical
similarity between arsenate (AsO3−4 ) and phosphate (PO
3−
4 ). Some chemical pathways
cannot differentiate between the arsenate and phosphate, thus contributing to the quick
biological toxicity produced by AsO3−4 . However, downstream metabolic processes
that use phosphate are hypothesized not to be compatible with arsenate. It is this
conclusion that Wolfe-Simon et al. (2011) question with their experiment on GFAJ-1.
The specific causal conclusions from this study can be listed as follows: GFAJ-1 uses
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arsenate as a nutrient; and GFAJ-1 incorporates arsenic into its DNA in place of
phosphorous.
It is worth noting some of the measurement details behind these conclusions. When
Wolfe-Simon et al. (2011) isolated the microbe and placed it in an arsenic-concentrated
environment, they found that the microbe grew at 60% of its growth rate—increasing
by over 20-fold in cell numbers after 6 days (2011, p. 1164). It is important to note that
in this particular set-up, phosphate was characterized as being “insufficient to elicit
growth in the control” and was treated as being absent (2011, p. 1164). (This detail
is important for the critique of the study that I develop shortly.) The growth of the
bacterium was observed by using two independent measurement processes: scanning
electron microscope and transmission electron microscope. In addition to this, Wolfe-
Simon et al. used multiple mass-spectrometry techniques to identify that the microbe
used arsenate as a replacement for phosphate in its DNA. Specifically, extracted nucleic
acid from arsenate positive/phosphate negative samples showed increased arsenate
and decreased phosphate relative to extracted nucleic acid from the negative arse-
nate/positive phosphate samples (2011, p. 1165). According to Wolfe-Simon et al.,
this shows that arsenic is incorporated into the DNA backbone of GFAJ-1 in place of
phosphorus, and it is with an estimated 4% replacement of phosphorous as arsenic
(2011, p. 1164). But Reaves et al. (2012) criticize the intervention methods and results
and posit more careful intervention techniques. Setting up the Reaves et al. (2012)
account will clarify the puzzle about how to represent the causal details of GFAJ-1.
One criticism from Reaves et al. (2012) is that the samples rich with arsenate and
without phosphate really had a basal level of phosphate (3-4µM), which has been
shown to sufficiently support moderate growth. So, it is not the case that the interven-
tions by Wolfe-Simon et al. could be characterized as having no phosphate (i.e. ‘P-’).
Additionally, using more stringent experimental conditions to eliminate phosphate and
to “purify” the DNA samples of any clinging arsenate, Reaves et al. (2012) did not find
covalently bound arsenate in the DNA structure. They took extra steps to make sure that
DNA was purified so that no arsenate would freely cling around. Some of their methods
can be summarized: Purify DNA via cesium chloride density-gradient centrifugation,
which separates DNA from impurities based on density; Remove excess salts left over
from the cesium chloride step; Separate DNA into nucleotide blocks; and Examine the
nucleotides with liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (LC/MS), which phys-
ically separates nucleotides on the basis of polarity and then analyzes their mass.
Reaves et al. (2012) found that: Arsenate does not contribute to growth of GFAJ-1
when phosphate is limiting; and DNA purified from cells grown with limiting phos-
phate and abundant arsenate does not show detectible amounts of covalently bound
arsenate (only free arsenate). What is interesting about the Reaves et al. results is that
the samples were obtained from Wolfe-Simon et al., so it is difficult to contest that the
new samples are problematic.
By using careful interventions, Reaves et al. (2012) demonstrated that there was
an error produced in the original Wolfe-Simon et al. (2011) experiment—i.e. that the
original DNA arsenic-consumption effect was an artifact of the lack of purification in
the preparatory procedure. While Reaves et al. showed that arsenate does not bind to
the DNA backbone, it is not clear why GFAJ-1 is so successful in arsenic rich envi-
ronments. In other words, there are missing causal details about GFAJ’s metabolism
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that need further intervention. That is, does arsenate play an important causal role in
GFAJ’s cellular growth—even if it’s not bound to DNA? An answer to this question
requires a detailed intervention—one that can be characterized using IEP.
Basturea et al. (2012) intervene by using a laboratory-produced strain of Escherichia
coli in order to make a causal conclusion about arsenic-induced cellular growth in
GFAJ-1. By using a produced bacterium they provide an explanation of the natural
growth of GFAJ-1 in arsenate-rich environments. The simple version is that arsenate
actually produces phosphate via ribosomal degradation. I will show how the manipu-
lation of conditions in the laboratory-produced organism (E. coli) is instructive about
representing GFAJ-1 interactions in a natural environment.
Let’s begin with some causally relevant information that is used by Basturea et al.
(2012) to structure their experiment. I will model this information using IEP 3. There
are two relevant causal conditions. The first condition (C1) is the composition of the
growth medium. A given medium can be C+arsenate or C−arsenate and C+phosphate or
C−phosphate. The second condition (C2) is growth, which can be characterized in terms
of C+growth or Cnullgrowth. A manipulation on C1 produces clear changes in C2, which
I will shortly describe. Basturea et al. (2012) take a few particular observations from
Wolfe-Simon et al. (2011), which can be structured as follows:
1. C−arsenate and C−phosphate medium produces Cnullgrowth.
2. Only upon the addition of 40 mm C+arsenate (and maintenance of C−phosphate) is
there a long lag of ∼ 80 h, followed by C+growth. The total growth is a 20-fold
increase in cell number over 6 days.
The qualification in (2) is very important that only with the addition of 40 mm C+arsenate
does growth occur. The reason why is that the we know from the Reaves et al. (2012)
study that the C−phosphate medium still has negligible amounts of phosphate that can
be a factor. However, Basturea et al. point out that without the addition of further
arsenic there was no growth. This means that the small levels of phosphate are not
stimulating growth, but the addition of arsenic does stimulate growth. Isolating the
causal conditions helps us to see that the small levels of phosphate are not sufficient for
growth, but the addition of arsenate is sufficient for growth. Next, I turn the produced
bacterium used by Basturea et al. (2012) in order to test these same results.
The laboratory-produced organism is MG1655 (seq)* I−, which was “constructed
by Donald Court (NCI, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD) and provided by
Kenneth Rudd (University of Miami)” (Basturea et al., p. 28816). The term ‘construc-
tion’ is key here because MG1655 (seq)* I− is created in a laboratory with certain
modifications. For example, it has an rph-1 mutation that leads to low levels of pyrE
and pyrimidine starvation; and it can grow in low levels of uracil but grows exponen-
tially once more uracil is added (Jensen 1993). The choice of MG1655 (seq)* I− seems
to be only for the purpose of similarities in ribosomal degradation process (Basturea
et al. 2012, p. 28817). But I’d like to add that there can be another important reason for
the use of a strain of E. coli: uracil uptake, which MG1655 (seq)* I− is sensitive to, is
interrupted by arsenate (Burton 1977). This could be an indicator that the reason for
using E. coli is that it is sensitive to arsenate. Not only are there mimetic reasons to use
MG1655 (seq)* I− in place of GFAJ-1, there are is also a practical reason: GFAJ-1 is
difficult to obtain. This adds an interesting pragmatic element to the intervention-based
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production. Sometimes systems are produced for practical ease. Basturea et al. also
simulated the medium of the original GFAJ-1 bacterium. They placed the MG1655
(seq)* I− cells in the various media, with the kind of chemical composition described
by Wolfe-Simon et al. (2011) (2012, p. 28817).
The lab-produced E. coli bacterium within the replicated media supported the orig-
inal Wolfe-Simon et al. (2011) observation by having the following results (modeled
using IEP-3):
1. C−arsenate and C−phosphate medium produces Cnullgrowth.
2. Only upon the addition of 40 mm C+arsenate there is a long lag of ∼ 80 h, followed
by C+growth. However, there is a small addition here, presented by fine-grained
measurement. In C+arsenate and C−phosphate medium, cells initially died; however,
a small population survived, and after a small lag, the culture of those cells grew
(C+growth). I will come back to this added result shortly.
Basturea et al. introduce a new causal condition that is relevant for the mechanism
behind growth. That new causal condition is ribosomal degradation—Crdegradation,
which can be evaluated based on percentage. In the C−arsenate and C+phosphate medium,
Crdegradation was reported to be only at 10%. This means that phosphate is not sig-
nificantly stimulating ribosomal degradation. However, in C+arsenate and C−phosphate
medium Crdegradation goes up to 70%, which is considered “massive” ribosomal degra-
dation (2012, p. 28818).
Characterizing this experiment (using IEP-4) requires at least two levels of charac-
terization. First, it is important to characterize the similarity between the Basturea et al.
(2012) study and the Wolfe-Simon et al. (2011) study. Both studies had an important
result that indicated ribosomal degradation. In both studies there was the disappear-
ance of 16 S and 23 S rRNA bands in the presence of C+arsenate and C−phosphate.
Basturea et al. characterize this band disappearance as a reliable indicator of riboso-
mal degradation; and they use this indicator to create parallel links between the studies
(2012, p. 28817). That is, not only is there a relation between the organisms in the two
studies (MG1655 (seq)* I− and GFAJ-1), but also between the media used (Carsenate
and Cphosphate), and now the biomarker indicator for ribosomal degradation (the disap-
pearance of 16 S and 23 S rRNA). Characterizing the similarities between the studies
is necessary because Basturea et al. are making a causal claim about GFAJ-1, without
using that bacterium. In order to make such a claim, the mimetic relation has to be
established. In this case the two bacteria, media, and results are relevantly similar.
It is important to note the pragmatic consideration here—there is not strict isomor-
phism between the two studies—but the experimenters judge sufficient similarities in
different parts of the experiment.
Next, it is important to apply IEP-4 in order to represent the causes. What does
it mean that in C+arsenate and C−phosphate medium Crdegradation goes up to 70%? Is
it relevant that in C+arsenate and C−phosphate medium, cells initially died and then
grew? This is where we need a theoretical relation between ribosomal degradation and
growth. Given that C+arsenate and Cgrowth (as well as C+arsenate and Crdegradation) are
indicated to be in a causal relation (by IEP-3), how can a theoretical representational
framework characterize the causal relation? First, there is a new cellular category
that is posited. Basturea et al. (2012) show that placing cells in a C+arsenate medium
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(irrespective of phosphate) leads to cells that they characterize as ‘arsenate-tolerant’.
This means that these cells are resistant to any arsenate degradation produced by
40 mm arsenate. Second, there is a theoretical causal mechanism that is used by
Basturea et al. as a result of previous understanding between ribosomal degradation
and phosphate production (2012, p. 28818). According to Basturea et al. arsenate
induces massive ribosome degradation—which releases free bases from RNA—thus
providing a source of phosphate for the remaining arsenate-tolerant cells (2012, p.
28818). The simple causal story is that arsenate-tolerant cells survive and use the
phosphate produced by ribosomal degradation. So, these cells do thrive in arsenic-
rich environments, but the causal explanation is more detailed than shown by Wolfe-
Simon et al. (2011) and Reaves et al. (2012). Now we see the causal relation between
C+arsenate, Crdegradation, and Cgrowth, and it is made apparent by using an intervention
system—lab manufactured E. coli.
4 IEP application: causal information about systems
I have explained that IEP is useful because the manipulation of conditions indicates
causal relations, which can be represented using theoretical representational frame-
works (minimal/operational, instrument, or well-developed). But the representation of
causes should not be limited to regularities under study like the one presented in the
previous section. I think that equally important representations are of causes in inter-
vention systems as well as technological systems. In this section, I briefly suggest the
usefulness of IEP for both kinds of regularities (Sects. 4.1 and 4.3). I also make more
general comments about the nature of production to set up the relationship between
intervention systems and technological systems (Sect. 4.2).
4.1 IEP and causes in intervention systems
In the previous section, I used Chang’s (2004) example of manufacturing the boil-
ing point of water to illustrate how condition manipulation can be informative about
causal relations in regularities under study. In this example, manipulating atmo-
spheric pressure and dissolved gas tells us something about regularities under study
in temperature—such as, kinetic energy of molecules, pressure, and volume. In such
examples of experimental production, the scientific goal is to manipulate conditions
to observe changes in the effect in order to study a given regularity (e.g., tempera-
ture). For experimental purposes it might help to differentiate a sample of water that
is controlled in a laboratory to produce a given temperature versus a sample of water,
un-manipulated by experimenters. But even if such differentiations are not made, we
still represent something about temperature parameters as a result of the manipulation
of conditions.
Sometimes effects take on a mimetic intervention, as discussed in Sects. 2.2 and 3.3.
In such cases, the manipulation of conditions can be instructive about representing
natural regularities. For example, according to Elowitz and Lim (2010) an important
function for synthetic biology is to create systems in which we can isolate causal
relations rather than investigate a totality of molecular interactions. For instance, by
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creating synthetic cellular networks scientists can isolate the function-pathway rela-
tionship. This is in contrast to looking at the function of the pathway within the context
of total cellular interactions. Bashor et al. (2010) outline this as a complex process
where manipulation can occur through genetic and chemical means. Parts of a cell can
also be rearranged in order to theorize about the stability of the causal hierarchy in the
cell (Bashor et al. 2010).
IEP is also informative about the causal relations in unreliable results. Through
IEP-3 problematic causal relations about a given intervention system can be identified.
The mesosome is an example of an effect that taught scientists something about their
interventions as well as their characterization of the mesosome. The simplified story
of the mesosome is that it was originally taken to be a genuine cellular structure, but
it was later found to be a result produced in error by chemical fixation in a specific
preparatory procedure.18 But the causal analysis is not simple in this historical case of
experimentation. Part of the reason is because the mesosome was detected by different
types of microscopes. Using IEP-3, we can characterize the different microscopes as
manipulations of relevant causal conditions. Even though each microscope (and thus
the physical sub-processes embodied in that microscope) is varied, the mesosome still
appears—meaning that it is causally stable or invariant.19 According to Wimsatt’s
(2007) discussion of the details in Culp’s (1994) account, support for the mesosome
as a natural entity “stopped accumulating” in parallel with an increase in support for
the mesosome as a product of preparation methods. In Wimsatt’s (2007) re-tracing
of the mesosome story, he mentions that at a certain point scientists had a “recipe
book for how to produce or avoid mesosomes” (381 my emphasis). The production
story is important. By modifying key preparatory conditions, scientists found under
what conditions the mesosome is produced. While the mesosome was causally stable
under different microscopes, it was not stable under different preparatory conditions.
According to Ebersold et al. (1981), when a specific manipulation was made—namely,
cryofixation followed by “freeze-substitution” (the substitution of ice by an organic
solvent containing the fixative)—the mesosome was not produced. There are two
physical conditions relevant to the production of the mesosome: First is the speed of
freezing (slow vs. rapid); and second, the fixative used (ice vs. organic solvent). Using
IEP-3, we can characterize these conditions as C f reezespeed—with values ‘slow’ and
‘rapid’—and C f ixative.—with values ‘ice’ versus ‘organic solvent’. Once C f reezespeed
was set to ‘rapid’ and C f ixative was set to ‘organic solvent’, the mesosome was not
produced. It is important to note that both physical conditions have as much to do with
preparatory conditions as they do with procedure. Mesosome measurement is order
and time dependent, and the details of the temporal conditions should be outlined by
a detailed experimental procedure. The consequence of this experimental work is that
representations of the mesosome have transitioned from attributing it as an intrinsic
structure of the cell to attributing it as an ‘artifact’, produced by slow freezing and ice
fixative in the preparatory procedure. Specifically, current theoretical representations
characterize the mesosome as:
18 For debate on measurement methods and the mesosome see Culp (1994), Rasmussen (1993, 2001) and
Hudson (1999).
19 Woodward’s (2006) notion of ‘causal robustness’ is relevant here.
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1. An invagination in the cytoplasmic membrane,
2. Produced by preparation-induced contractions of the nucleosome,
3. The production being facilitated by cytoplasmic membrane damage (Wimsatt
2007, p. 381).
What we learn from this example is how the manipulation of intervention system
conditions is informative for changing our theoretical representations.20
4.2 Production and stabilization: an interlude
So far in Sects. 3 and 4.1, my discussion has focused on how manipulating IEP systems
informs causal representations. This is a fine-grained view of experimental practice,
which spotlights a specific relation between experimental production and representa-
tion. But it is important to say something more general about scientific production. My
view rests on a specific type of productive process: stabilization. At a certain point,
a scientist’s skillful manipulation of an intervention system stabilizes both in physi-
cal conditions and representation. Without stabilization in physical conditions, results
cannot be repeatable and reproducible. For example, without stabilization, boiling
point produces inconsistent temperature values and even becomes useless for thermo-
metric calibration. Without stabilization in theoretical representation, some “thing”
cannot be precisely and accurately characterized as reliable/unreliable. For instance,
without properly modifying the characterization of the mesosome, theoretical repre-
sentation would provide uncertainty about classifying the structure as a part of the
cell or something produced through measurement damage. My use of ‘stabilization’
requires reference to some aforementioned philosophical accounts.
Hacking (1983) and van Fraassen (2008) describe the stability of productions in
terms of physical conditions. Once conditions are standardized, a given production
can be repeated and reproduced. van Fraassen (2008) advances the point by describing
stabilization between practice and theoretical representation: theory co-stabilizes with
measurement practice to characterize what is reliably measured. I take a similar view
to van Fraassen (2008)—reliability is not merely determined by physical conditions.
It requires theoretical-representational characterization. The three aforementioned
methodological parameters—repeatability, reproducibility, and reliability—need a bit
of organization.
Radder’s (2003) account is useful to provide some structure. On his account, in
experimental practice there is “stability” of the object-apparatus system in two senses
that are parallel to this discussion: (1) the stability of material conditions; (2) knowl-
edge about some features of the object (and apparatus) (2003, pp. 154–155). While
my terminology focuses on components of IEP systems rather than distinguishing
object from apparatus, I agree with Radder’s structure of ‘stability’. His structure can
be used to group repeatability and reproducibility on the material side of stability and
reliability on the theory side of stability. The former are mostly about material condi-
20 The discussion of cross checking of measurement processes has been extensively detailed in accounts
of measurement robustness in Woodward (2006), Wimsatt (2007) and Keyser (2016a, b).
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tions (even though they do involve procedural considerations); and the latter involves
making a characterization based on what counts as error.
For my account, production is about stabilizing some intervention system in terms
of physical conditions and also representational content. That is, I see the process of
production in terms of controlling conditions to yield repeatable, reproducible, and
reliable intervention systems—where the purposes of the experiment dictate which
of these parameters is the center of attention. In the cases of the manufactured bac-
terium and also the mesosome, reliability drove the production process, but this also
resulted in repeatability and reproducibility in the lab. In the case of thermometry,
creating a repeatable and reproducible effect (e.g., standardized boiling point) pushed
the calibration of measurement devices and the reliable theoretical story.
I take the view that regularities under study, intervention systems, and technological
systems can all benefit from the stabilization process of production in the same way:
IEP can be used to develop causal representations. I have thus far discussed regular-
ities under study and intervention systems, but technological systems require further
analysis. It seems that in the case studies mentioned in Sects. 3 and 4, by stabilizing
the IEP practice, scientists are also creating technologies. Furthermore, the produc-
tion of technologies seems to require repeatability, reproducibility, and reliability. An
interesting philosophical issue arises. How does the stability of intervention systems
relate to a particular kind of productive process—the development of technology?
4.3 IEP and technological systems
I now turn to the interaction between IEP and the development of technological sys-
tems. The relation between scientific practice and technology has been explored in
detail (in e.g., Janich 1978; Ihde 1991; Radder 1996, 2003; Carusi 2016a, b). Because
the relationship between intervention and production is not the centerpiece of this
discussion, but rather the starting steps for further exploration about the nature of tech-
nology in experiment, I keep my points brief. I present three points. First, I characterize
‘technological systems’ as on a continuum with intervention systems. Technological
systems are stabilized in terms of repeatable, reproducible, and reliable productions;
but ultimately what counts as a ‘technological system’ versus an ‘intervention system’
is determined by considerations of the user of that system. Second, I present that IEP
effects are informative for the development of new technologies; and third, Iillustrate
that new technologies can, as a byproduct, develop new experimental effects.
I draw my first point about technological systems from Rheinberger’s (1992, 1997,
2008) distinction between ‘epistemic things/objects’ and ‘technical objects’. Accord-
ing to Rheinberger 2008, ‘epistemic things’21 are the targets of research that are
not exactly known. In contrast, ‘technical things/objects’ are “characteristically deter-
mined”: “They are the instruments, apparatus, and other devices enabling and at the
same time bounding and confining the assessment of the epistemic things under inves-
tigation” (2008, p. 21). Both epistemic and technical objects are dependent on the
21 Rheinberger (1992, 1997, 2008) uses ‘epistemic things’ and ‘epistemic objects’ interchangeably—due
to the epistemic vagueness of the entities.
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technical conditions that shape these objects. Additionally, epistemic objects depend
on the specificity of technical objects. Rheinberger continues:
Without such specificity of the technical objects, the epistemic things would not
become shaped, but would rather dissipate in the hands of the researcher. Within
a particular research process, however, epistemic things can eventually become
specified and turned into technical objects. As such they can become part of the
technical conditions of the system. (2008, p. 21)
Technical objects can also revert back to the “epistemic status”. For Rheinberger, this
process continues as the “driving force” behind experimental systems. Thus far I have
not differentiated kinds of intervention systems. But I take Rheinberger’s distinction
to be important because it points to the difference between vague and determinate
systems. I interpret that for Rheinberger, the determinacy is on two levels: practice
and characterization. That is, scientists can work with the technical conditions to
reproduce the technical object. Additionally, the conditions for the technical object
are characterizable, operationally. Scientists can trace the production process through
instruments, background conditions, etc.; and there are no uncertain questions about
error and artifact production.
I take a similar view that, what I call, ‘technological systems’ are characteristically
determined. On my view, technological systems are on a continuum with intervention
systems. Both result from the process of production where conditions are manipulated
and controlled. Both can involve stable behavior—repeatability, reproducibility, and
reliability—although technological systems are more stable. But repeatability, repro-
ducibility, and reliability are not sufficient for differentiating intervention systems
and technological systems. The necessary and sufficient condition—that determines
where to locate a given scientific production on the continuum of intervention system
and technological system—is the scientific use of that production. When scientists are
experimenting with the mesosome to understand its status as an artificial component of
the cell, the mesosome can be characterized as an intervention system. However, once
mesosome production is stabilized in the sense of producing repeatable, reproducible,
and reliable results, it can be used as a technology—e.g., university students can have
a mesosome kit to learn some specific lesson. The deeper point about production is
that there is a co-development between the stability of a given production and its use
as a technological system. Stable behavior often pushes how something is used in a
scientific context. The broader question is: What does this imply about the relationship
between scientific experimentation and technology?
Janich (1978) has proposed the conclusion that science is technology because of
the dependence of scientific knowledge on instrumental practice, language, and prag-
matic/normative considerations. I am sympathetic to the general view that much of
IEP practice has a strong relation to engineering and technology. That is, interven-
tion systems become more stable and result in being used as technological systems.
However, like Radder (2003), I do not think that theoretical claims are reducible to
experimental procedures. There is a co-development between the two, which I have
outlined in Sect. 3, and the reductive relationship is too simplistic. I also do not think
that theory dictates the processes of intervention systems and technological systems.
To use Russo’s (2016) term, intervention and technology are not “subordinate” to
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theory. I take a view similar to Russo’s (2016) that technology is neither subordi-
nate to theory nor is it merely a tool for instrumental realism. Rather, technology is
“poietic”—i.e., it “partakes in the production of knowledge” (Russo 2016, p. 147).
On my view, intervention systems are integral to representation in the scientific pro-
cess. Because technological systems are on a continuum with intervention systems,
this would give technological systems the same status. Often we think of technology
as being a final outcome of a complex scientific process (e.g., the manufacturing of
the reliable thermometer), but according to Russo, technology plays an integral and
embedded role in “…producing and analysing data, and in detecting signal” (2016,
p. 152). Of particular interest to this discussion is the “mediating” role of technology,
which relies on how the “epistemic agent” uses the technology (2016, pp. 159–160).
My account relies on the user of the system to characterize it as an intervention sys-
tem or a technological system. But the user doesn’t merely characterize a system, the
user also determines how one type of system can be effectively implemented for the
development of the other. I now turn to the final two points in this discussion.
The final points that I present are that IEP effects are informative for the develop-
ment of new technologies and that new technologies can, as a byproduct, develop new
experimental effects. Sometimes, effects can be used to create new technologies that
require standardization. For example, the structured interactions of thin film transistors
(TFT’s) can be manipulated for the purposes of LED technology (Machrone 2013).
This technology is based on the Hosono et al. (2005) research on crystal structure. I
add that such technologies often result from experimentally produced effects. Hosono
et al. (2005) found that by manipulating the crystal structure of certain materials we
can experimentally produce a compound that conducts electricity. The reason why
this is an experimental effect is because even if a given compound’s conductivity is
low (e.g., due to the asymmetry in the crystal structure), manipulating experimental
conditions by adding titanium atoms to its structure produces symmetric cages, which
allows free electron flow (Hosono et al. 2005). Through this experimental intervention
there are two types of potential representations. The first is scientific representations
about crystal structures in terms of free electron flow. But the second type of represen-
tation is about how TFT’s can be incorporated into a technological system—namely,
the LED television.22 This requires not only understanding how physical conditions
work, but it also requires considerations about design related to materials, structure,
and viewing experience. Hacking’s (1983) aforementioned description of effects and
repeated production is relevant. Technological systems are often re-produced. Just like
the intervention procedure is important for the re-production of effects, so too is the
technological procedure. Both require representation of the causal relations within the
system (whether effect or technological system).
New technologies can also be used to push IEP interactions. Caponi et al. (2016)
are experimenting with multicellular morphology, regulation, differentiation, and sig-
naling in order to understand what types of multicellular processes are possible to
22 A relevant term in relation to technological productions is ‘artifact’. Kroes’s (2003) has an important
account, where he analyses technological and experimental artifacts. Chakrabarty (2012) summarizes def-
initions for the term. Using this term would add unnecessary complexity to my discussion because its
definition multidimensional and overlaps with ‘effects’.
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produce. The motivation behind their productive intervention is to find a solution to
cognitive rehabilitation problems. Specifically, their aim is to synthesize a functional
system that can mimic neural functionality, thus being able to communicate with other
neurons, while at the same time being able to exchange information with human-made
electronic devices. Such a medical technological system serves as a mediator between
artificial technologies and a biological system.
In the current research by Caponi et al. (2016), the goal of creating a functional
medical technology has produced smaller effects along the way, which have been
standardized. For example, ‘memristors’ are units that vary its resistance depending
on previous voltage exposure. Caponi et al. (2016) organized experimental conditions
in order to produce a “hybrid” system consisting of neural tissue and polyaniline
(PANI), which is composed of layers of organic polymers with memristive prop-
erties. This hybrid system is both an effect and a technological system. So far the
PANI conditions do not adversely affect other conditions, such as toxicity. However,
the causal interaction between PANI and “cell suffering” (e.g., indicated by break-
down of bio-membrane and protein-to-lipid ratio) is still unclear. In this experiment,
cells grown on PANI substrate show consistent cellular suffering (Caponi et al. 2016).
I add that this creates a representational causal puzzle: What are the parameters that
can explain cellular suffering in the presence of PANI? Currently, the hypothesized
parameters/relations are substrate interactions. But in order to fill the details of the
parameters/relations, more manipulation is needed—e.g., by varying memristive mate-
rials. In this example, a technological goal is fueling the production of smaller effects
(e.g., polyaniline). It is also important to note that because such technological projects
require multidisciplinary work, new experimental collaborations in neuroscience and
nanotechnology are being developed—so the “use” is community-based (see Russo
2016). The research goals of the multidisciplinary collaborators will dictate what sorts
of effects are relevant for production and the causal detail in the representations.
To summarize, I have characterized how IEP is useful for representations of causes
in regularities under study, intervention systems, and technological systems. Signifi-
cant views and suggestions have been made about effects in relation to intervention
systems and new technologies:
1. In Sect. 4.1: The manipulation of intervention system conditions is informative for
how we represent some thing as an intrinsic property of a natural system versus
something produced by the intervention system;
2. In Sect. 4.2: The productive process relevant to both intervention systems and tech-
nological systems is stabilization: creating repeatable, reproducible, and reliable
“things”.
3. In Sect. 4.3 there are at least three views about intervention systems and techno-
logical systems:
(a) Technological systems are on a continuum with intervention systems and are
differentiated by characterization.
(b) Effects can develop into new technologies, in which case new technological
representations are developed.
(c) New technologies can push IEP interactions such that new effects and repre-
sentations are developed.
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Understanding the relations between experiment, representation, and technology is
the next step in extending IEP into the realm of technology. This will require paying
particular attention to how technology is used to represent, which may require a new set
of questions about perception as it relates to technology. Ihde (1990, 1991, 1993) has
extensively outlined an important concept important for the relation between technol-
ogy and representation: ‘embodiment relations’ between human beings and artifacts.
Embodiment relations require objects (artifacts) through which the environment is
perceived—such as the use of lenses for distance. Ihde’s focus on such relations is
interesting for an extension of IEP in at least two ways. The first way has to do with
the content of representation. On Ihde’s view, when embodied relations materialize
a piece of technical artifact is mastered for some kind of perception. Thinking about
it in terms of using a stick for topographical information is helpful. Suppose one tra-
verses the land with the stick, thus mastering the act of navigation. In addition to
know-how, it seems like some sort of explicit representation is also forming. So, in
what way does the mastery of using embodiment relations add to theoretical repre-
sentation? The theoretical representation can be a representation of the artifact (e.g.,
understanding your tool), perception (e.g., understanding an explicit mental repre-
sentation), or the relation between the two (e.g., understanding the activity of using
the tool)? Brey (2000) has an interesting variation on this issue: many embodiment
relations imply forgetting that we are using the artifact; in such cases how do we
represent details about those artifacts as being separate from our bodies? Questions
about human-to-artifact embodiment relations as promoting theoretical representation
building are parallel to the questions that I have attempted to answer about production
as promoting representation building. But the former is even more complex than the
latter because it requires understanding the role of cognition. Worth noting is that such
a discussion will require drawing on literature in distributed cognition as it relates to
scientific practice as well as the nature of cognition. For example, Giere (2006) dis-
cusses cognition being distributed in scientific modeling; and Chandrasekharan and
Nersessian (2015) discuss how representations changes the nature of cognitive tasks
while building computational models in the laboratory.
The second interesting point about Ihde’s concept of ‘embodiment relations’ is
about the focus on relations rather than objects. When focusing on relations in the
context of experiment and technology, a previous account (from Radder 2003) of
object-apparatus pairs is relevant. There are complex relations between the object
and apparatus—e.g., production for IEP; correlation for Radder. In this discussion, I
have focused on detailing intervention systems in their productive and representational
roles. But we can expand the scope of intervention to focus on the detailed relations
between humans, effects, technology, and the natural phenomena. My concern in this
discussion has been limited to effects, with some suggestion about technology.
5 Concluding remarks
Gaston Bachelard’s claim about the complexity of phenomena and ideas echoes in the
background of this discussion:
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There are no simple phenomena; every phenomenon is a fabric of relations.
There is no such thing as a simple nature, a simple substance; a substance is a
web of attributes. And there is no such thing as a simple idea…Simple ideas are
working hypotheses or concepts, which must undergo revision before they can
assume their proper epistemological role. (1984, pp. 147–148)
Rather than being philosophical background noise, Bachelard’s statement has set
the philosophical structure for important elements that I have attempted to refresh. In
this discussion, I start with the picture that “produced” phenomena are complex and so
is their relation to building scientific representations. Additionally, I take Bachelard’s
suggestion to study the complex in order to get the idea of the simple (1984, p.
152). That is, in order to understand how to represent a simple causal relation, the
process of producing complex effects is necessary. Also noteworthy is Bachelard’s
emphasis on seeking truth through “artificial” means. My discussion has focused on
how artificial production (IEP) informs representations. While I do not claim that
such representations instantiate the truth, it is important to emphasize that the purpose
of IEP as seeking adequate representations of intervention systems. How adequacy
relates to accuracy and truth is a discussion for another time.
In this discussion I have explained how experimental productions are informative
for representations. I have illuminated a performative function in measurement and
experimentation in general: intervention in the form of production. In organizing IEP,
I have detailed ‘intervention systems’ as well as how experimental conditions pro-
duce effects. I have also showed how IEP can be representationally informative by
discussing the relationship between IEP and theoretical representation. Finally, I have
applied IEP to causal representation in: regularities under study; intervention systems;
and new technological systems.
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